McClellan's Crimean Report X: Conclusion

Attack on the Malakoff-William Simpson

The result of the operations of this long and eventful siege was that on the 8th of September,1855, the French had, at a great cost of life and labor, pushed their approaches to the distance of 32 paces from the counterscarp of the Malakoff, and not quite so near the other works. The English, meanwhile, had scarcely reached within 225 yards of the ditch of the Redan.

On that day the assault was made at noon upon at least six points.

A few minutes later than the assault upon the Malakoff the English attacked the Redan.

"The Russians being now upon the alert, they did not pass over the open space before them without loss; but the mass succeeded in crossing the ditch and gaining the salient of the work. Finding themselves entirely unsupported they at once took shelter behind the traverses, whence the example and efforts of their officers did not avail to draw them, in order to occupy the work closing the gorge. Having in vain used every effort, having dispatched every officer of his staff to the rear urging that supports should be at once sent up, and seeing that the Russians were now beginning to assemble in force, the commander of the English storming party reluctantly determined to proceed himself to obtain reinforcements. Scarcely had he reached the trenches, and at last obtained authority to move up the required succor, when upon turning to lead them forward, lie saw the party he had left in the work rapidly and hopelessly driven out at the point of the bayonet. No further effort was made to carry the work. It would, in all probability, have failed, and would only have caused a useless sacrifice of men.

The failure of the English assault may he attributed partly to the fact that their advanced trenches were too small to accommodate the requisite force without confusion, in part to their not being pushed sufficiently near the Redan, but chiefly to that total absence of conduct and skill in the arrangements for the assault which left the storming party entirely without support. Had it been followed at once by strong reinforcements, it is almost certain that the English would have retained possession of the work.

The two French attacks on the west of the central ravine were probably intended only as feints; at all events, the parties engaged were soon driven back to their trenches with considerable loss, and effected nothing. Their attempts upon the Little Redan, and the works connecting it with the Malakoff, met with even less success than the English assault. The Russians repulsed the French with great loss, meeting with the bayonet the more adventurous men who reached the parapet. Thus, in five points out of six the defenders were fully victorious, but, unfortunately for them, the sixth was the decisive point.

In their admirable arrangements for the attack of the Malakoff, the French counted on two things for success: first, they had ascertained that the Russians were in the habit of relieving the guard of the Malakoff at noon, and that a great part of the old guard marched out before the new one arrived, in order to avoid the loss which would arise from crowding the work with men ; in the second place, it was determined to keep up a most violent vertical fire until the very moment of the assault, thus driving the Russians into the bomb proofs, and enabling the storming party to enter the work with but little opposition. The hour of noon was therefore selected for the assault, and the strong columns intended for the work were at an early hour assembled in the advanced trenches, all in admirable order, and furnished with precise instructions.

The mortars maintained an unremitting fire until the moment appointed. The very instant the last volley was discharged the storming party of Zouaves rushed over the thirty paces before them, and were in the work before the astonished Russians knew what had happened. It was stated that this party lost but eleven men in entering the work. Other troops advanced rapidly to the support of the storming party, a bridge was formed by rolling up five ladders with planks lashed to them, a communication was at once commenced between the advanced trench and the bridge, brigade after brigade passed over, the redoubt was at once occupied by the storming party, and thus the Malakofif and with it Sebastopol, was won. The few Russians remaining in the work made a desperate resistance. Many gallant attempts were made by Russian columns to ascend the steep slope in rear and regain the lost work ; but the road was narrow, difficult, and obstructed; the position strong, and the French in force. All their furious efforts were in vain, and the Malakofl" remained in the possession of those who had so gallantly and skilfully won it. With regard to the final retreat to the north side, it can only be said that a personal examination of the locality merely confirms its necessity, and the impression so generally entertained that it was the finest operation of the war ; so admirably was it carried out that not a straggler remained behind; a few men so severely wounded as to be unfit for rough and hurried transportation were the sole ghastly human trophies that remained to the allies.

The retreat, being a more difficult operation than the assault, may be worthy of higher admiration; but the Russian retreat to the north side and the French assault upon the Malakoff must each be regarded as a masterpiece of its kind, deserving the closest study. It is difficult to imagine what point in either can be criticized, for both evinced consummate skill, discipline, coolness, and courage. With regard to the artillery, I would merely remark that the Russian guns were not of unusual calibre, consisting chiefly of 24, 32, and 42-pounders; and that the termination of the siege was mainly due to the extensive use of mortars finally resorted to by the allies. If they had been employed in the beginning as the main reliance, the siege would have been of shorter duration.

The causes of the unusual duration of this siege naturally resolve themselves into three classes : the skillful disposition of the Russians, the faults of the allies, and natural causes beyond the control of either party. Among the latter may be mentioned the natural strength of the position and the severity of the winter. In the first class, there may be alluded to: the skill with which the Russian engineers availed themselves of the nature of the ground; the moral courage which induced them to undertake the defence of an open town with a weak garrison; the constant use they made of sorties, among which may properly be classed the battles of Balaklava, Inkermann, and the Tchernaya; the ready ingenuity with which they availed themselves of the resources derived from the fleet; the fine practice of their artillery; their just appreciation of the true use of field works, and the admirable courage they always evinced in standing to their works to repel assaults at the point of the bayonet ; the employment of rifle pits on an extensive scale; finally, the constant reinforcements which they soon commenced receiving, and which enabled them to fill the gaps made in their ranks by disease and the projectiles of the allies.

The evidences of skill on the part of the allies, as well as the apparent faults on all sides, having been already alluded to, it is believed that the means have been furnished to enable any one to draw his own conclusions as to the history of this memorable passage of arms.

At different times during the siege a vast amount of labor was bestowed upon field works in front of Kamiesch and Balaklava, near the Inkermann, on the northern and eastern borders of the plateau, and along the Tchernaya; these works varied much in strength and character, sometimes consisting of continuous lines, again of detached redoubts.

The redoubts generally had ditches about 10' wide and 6' deep. In many cases these works were only undertaken when a narrow escape from some imminent danger had demonstrated their necessity.

The line in front of Kamiesch consisted of 8 pentagonal redoubts, connected by an infantry parapet; it ran from Streletzka bay nearly south to the sea, passing at a little more than a mile from the harbor of Kamiesch; it was never completely finished.

The position of the Russians, after the evacuation of the south side, was one of exceeding strength; their establishments were covered by Fort Sivernaia (a permanent work) and long lines of strong earthen batteries, which would have required a siege to reduce them.

The steep declivity of Mackenzie's heights, accessible at but a few points, all of which were strongly guarded, rendered the approach from the south a matter of extreme difficulty; it would appear that the allies were wise in refusing to attempt to force the passage, unless the effort had been made immediately after the fall of the Malakoff, before the Russians recovered from the shock.

Efforts were made to turn the extreme Russian left by the valley of Baidar, but they only served to ascertain the hopelessness of the undertaking.

The detached operations against Kinburn, Eupatoria, Kertch, the sea of Azoz, &c. , cannot be regarded as having produced any effect upon the general result of the war; they served chiefly to weaken the main body of the allies, to annoy and exasperate the Russians, to occupy the attention of some of their irregular troops, and to destroy more private than public property.

The most accurate topographical map of the ground around Sebastopol, that I have seen, is one published at the hydrographic office of the admiralty, February 2, 1856, and entitled "Sebastopol: showing the Russian defence works and the approaches of the allied armies; by Lieutenant George R. Wilkinson, R. N., under the direction of Captain T. Spratt, R. N. C. B., September 1, 1855."

The permanent defences of the harbor of Sebastopol against an attack by water, although inferior in material and the details of construction to our own most recent works, proved fully equal to the purpose for which they were intended. Indeed, the occurrences on the Pacific, the Baltic, and the Black sea, all seem to establish, beyond controversy, the soundness of the view so long entertained by all intelligent military men, that well constructed fortifications must always prove more than a match for the strongest fleets.

It is believed that a calm consideration of the events so hastily and imperfectly narrated in the preceding pages must lead all unprejudiced persons among our countrymen to a firm conviction on two vital points:

1st. That our system of permanent coast defences is a wise and proper one, which ought to be completed and armed with the least possible delay.

2d. That mere individual courage cannot suffice to overcome the forces that would be brought against us, were we involved in an European war, but that it must be rendered manageable by discipline, and directed by that consummate and mechanical military skill which can only be acquired by a course of education, instituted for the special purpose, and by long habit.

In the day of sailing vessels the successful siege of Sebastopol would have been impossible. It is evident that the Russians did not appreciate the advantages afforded by steamers, and were unprepared to sustain a siege.

This same power of steam would enable European nations to disembark upon our shores even a larger force than that which finally encamped around Sebastopol. To resist such an attack, should it ever be made, our cities and harbors must be fortified, and those fortifications must be provided with guns, ammunition, and instructed artillerists. To repel the advance of such an army into the interior, it is not enough to trust to the number of brave but undisciplined men that we can bring to bear against it.

An invading army of 15,000 or 20,000 men could easily be crushed by the unremitting attacks of superior numbers; but when it comes to the case of more than 100,000 disciplined veterans, the very multitude brought to bear against them works its own destruction; because, if without discipline and instruction, they cannot be handled, and are in their own way. We cannot afford a Moscow campaign.

Our regular army never can, and, perhaps, never ought to be large enough to provide for all the contingencies that may arise, but it should be as large as its ordinary avocations in the defence of the frontier will justify; the number of officers and non-commissioned officers should be unusually large, to provide for a sudden increase; and the greatest possible care should be bestowed upon the instruction of the special arms of the artillery and engineer troops.

The militia and volunteer system should be placed upon some tangible and effective basis; instructors furnished them from the regular army, and all possible means taken to spread sound military information among them.

In the vicinity of our seacoast fortifications it would be well to provide a sufficient number of volunteer companies with the means of instruction in heavy artillery; detailing officers of the regular artillery as instructors, who should at the same time he in charge of, and responsible for, the guns and material.

In time of war, or when war is imminent, local companies of regular artillery might easily he enlisted for short terms of service, or for the war, in the seacoast towns. The same thing might advantageously he carried into effect, on a small scale, in time of peace.

GEORGE B. McCLELLAN,

Captain First Cavalry,

January 14, 1857.

A cleaned up image of McClellan from an official commission photo

McClellan's Crimean Report IX

Siège de Sébastopol, chasseurs à pied de la Garde impériale. . . - D.A. Marie

We may now turn to the point of attack.

 The facts of the case are well known. For many months the operations of the French were directed entirely against the Flag-staff and Central Bastions, the English being engaged in what may be termed two false attacks against the Redan.

It was not until the spring of 1855 that the efforts of the French were at last turned towards securing possession of the Malakoff.

To appreciate the merits of this question, it is necessary again to refer to the map to bear in mind that the heights overlooking the Karabelnaia were considerably more elevated than those bordering upon the main city, and that the docks and other naval, as well as military establishments, were all located in the Karabelnaia suburb.

Were the Flag-staff Bastion carried, but a single step was gained; beyond it existed at least two lines of defence, both difficult to carry, before even the main city was reached. While these new approaches were being constructed, it would have been a simple matter for the Russians to border the commanding heights of the Karabelnaia with new batteries directed against the town; the fire from these, together with that from the works on the north side, would have rendered the victors very uncomfortable and insecure in their barren conquest; and the fleet could have retired to the vicinity of the Careening bay, where it, as well as the docks, would have been secure against direct injury.

By taking the Malakoff, the fleet and the establishments of the Russians lay exposed at the feet of the allies; its commanding position and proximity to the main harbor rendered further resistance useless when once occupied by them. Considerations relating to the facility of bringing up supplies and covering their depot very probably determined the direction of the early

French attacks, but by no means diminish the credit due to General Neil, who first turned the efforts of his countrymen in the right direction.

If a deficiency in men and means is assigned as a reason for the early operations of the allies, it is but another proof that, in undertaking the affair, they neglected one of the clearest rules of war, that is, to undertake no important operation without full and reliable information as to the obstacles to be overcome, and the means of resistance in the hands of the enemy.

Enough has already been said to justify the belief that a dilemma, difficult of solution, might be presented for the consideration of the allies: on the one hand, the comparatively small scale upon which the original expedition was organized; the intimation contained in some of the French instructions that "half a siege train" would suffice to capture Sebastopol, and the absence of all preparations for passing the winter in the Crimea, would indicate that the allied governments were well aware of the real weakness of Sebastopol at that time, and intended that it should be carried by a "coup de vigeur;" on the other hand, from the moment the armies landed, every movement was conducted in a manner indicating that the generals were under the impression that formidable defences were in front of them, and that nothing serious could be attempted until further supplies and reinforcements were received.

In regard to the detailed execution of the French attacks, little or nothing novel is to be observed. Even when coolly examining the direction of their trenches, after the close of the siege, it was very rare that a faulty direction could be detected; they always afforded excellent cover, and were well defiladed; in some cases the excavation of the double direct sap was carried to the depth of 6' in the solid rock.

The execution of many of the saps and batteries was worthy of a school of practice. In the parallels, bomb proofs were provided as temporary hospitals, offices for the generals on duty, &c. They did not use the sapper armor. The use of the sap roller was often attempted, but it could be employed only during the latter part of the attack upon the Malakoff, when the fire of the Russian artillery was nearly extinguished by the mortars; before that, as soon as a sap roller was placed in position some 30 guns would be brought to bear upon it, the result being its immediate destruction.

It may justly be said of the French approaches, that they admirably carried into practice their system of sapping. The technical skill and patient courage evinced by their officers and men in pushing forward such excellent approaches, under a most deadly fire, is worthy of all commendation, and is such as might have been expected from the antecedents of their corps of engineers. With regard to the English the case was different; it seemed as if they systematically abandoned the excellent system taught and perfected with so much care at Chatham.

Whenever the ground was difficult their trenches generally ceased to afford shelter; a shallow excavation in the rock, and a few stones thrown up in front, appeared to be all that was considered necessary in such cases. They were often faulty in direction as well as in profile, being not unfrequently badly defiladed, or not gaining ground enough, and entirely too cramped; nor were they pushed as close to the Redan as they ought to have been before giving the assault.

In too many cases the expression "tatonnement" of the French would seem to convey the best idea of their operations. Their batteries, however, were very well constructed. Their magazines, platforms, &c., were usually similar to those adopted at Chatham, although unnecessary deviations were sometimes complained of.

They employed neither armor nor the full sap; sometimes the half-full, hut generally the flying sap were employed. The excellent English magazines were generally covered with 7" or 8" timber, 2 layers of fascines, 2 layers of sand bags, and 5' or 6' of earth. During the siege three were exploded by 13" shells, hut it was supposed that in two of these cases the shells burst in the passage, as similar magazines resisted 13" shells falling on the roof; in the third case, the magazine was first struck fairly on the roof by a 13" shell, which laid it hare to the sand hags; the corporal of sappers in charge, being intoxicated, neglected to repair the damage, when another 13" shell struck in the same place and exploded the magazine.

A very good gabion was made, by the English, of the iron hoops of bales of hay, casks, &c. They were 3' high and 2' in diameter, having 11 stakes of sawed wood. The iron hoops were wattled as the ordinary withes, and were hound by iron straps running the whole length of the gabion. These were much employed in revetting the cheeks of embrasures, thus avoiding the use of raw hides. The first pair of gabions, at the throat, should not be of iron, since it was found that shot would often tear off pieces of the straps, which caused bad wounds.

Gabions were also made of split hoops.

The fascines were bound with iron straps, twisted by pincers, in addition to the ordinary withes. The dimensions of their materials varied much in size, being made by different parties.

Sand bags were very much employed in revetting batteries, traverses, &c.

Latrines were provided at the extremities of parallels and boyaux*, and cleansed with lime every day.

Water tanks and reservoirs were provided in the parallels, and filled every morning and evening by means of pack animals.

During the siege the English working parties and guards of the trenches generally paraded at 6 p. m., and moved off after dark, often suffering severely before reaching the trenches. The guards of the trenches went on duty in their red coats and forage caps, without knapsacks; working parties in working dress, and armed; muskets on the reverse of the trench. Generally double sentinels were posted, on their bellies, about 50 yards in advance of the trench.

Materials, guns, ammunition, &c., were carried up at night, "over the open."

 *Boyau (Fr.) - a communication trench, a sap pushed forward toward the enemy.  Typically constructed in a zigzag pattern to prevent exposure to direct fire from the front.

Sebastopol from the Extreme Right of the Trench Attack-William Simpson

"For the Purpose of Superintending the Interments of Remains . . ."

The reburial program was initiated within two months of Lee's capitulation at Appomattox.  In accordance with orders issued on 7 June 1865 by Headquarters, Department of  Washington, Captain James M. More, the founder of Arlington and Battleground national cemeteries, proceeded to the battlefields of the Wilderness and Spottsylvania Court House "for the purpose of superintending the interments of remains of Union soldiers yet unburied and marking their burial places for future identification."  Similar measures were taken in the West; on 23 June General George H. Thomas, commanding the Department of the Cumberland, instructed Chaplain William Earnshaw, Superintendent of the Stones River National Cemetery, "to take charge of the work of disinterring and reinterring remains in the national cemetery at Stones River." Due, however, to excessive heat of the summer season, field operations were suspended until October of that year.

The operations conducted by Captain Moore and Chaplain Earnshaw illustrate both the similarities and differences of graves registration problems in the Virginia and western theaters. Both officers enjoyed the benefits of wide experience in burial matters both had created cemeteries and understood the complications involved in the reinterment of remains. Proceeding by way of Belle Plain, Captain Moore reached the Wilderness battlefield some 14 months after the two-day encounter between Grant and Lee. He found 'hundreds of graves...without marking whatsoever." Exposed skeletons scattered in front of the enemy's abatis offered mute testimony to the savage assaults delivered by many Union regiments. Other skeletons were found partially buried in and near the trenches. Unburied remains, it is reported, were interred in two temporary cemeteries, "where the scenes of carnage appeared to be the greatest."

Intending originally to remove all partially buried remains to a suitable site. Captain Moore encountered the same difficulty that delayed Chaplain Earnshaw's reinterment program in the Stones River area-summer heat.

Completing his reconnaissance of the Wilderness battlefield, Captain Moore went on to Spottsylvania Court House, where he identified and marked with newly-inscribed wooden tablets the graves of 700 Union soldiers. The unidentified dead were marked by tablets bearing the inscription "Unknown, U. S. Soldier. "In all, he made 1,500 identifications on both battlefields-800 in the Wilderness and 700 at Spottsylvania Court House. This total, however, was only twenty-six percent of the 5,350 fatalities suffered on these fields.

-Evolution of the National Cemetery  System 1865-1880
by Edward Steere
Quartermaster Review-May/June 1953

McClellan's Crimean Report VIII

McClellan's report on the Crimea War continued . . .

Harbor at Balaklava crowded with shipping

This would seem to be the proper place to notice a popular fallacy which, for a time at least, gained extensive credence. It was, that the siege of Sebastopol proved the superiority of temporary (earthen) fortifications over those of a permanent nature. It is easy to show that it proved nothing of the kind, but that it only proved that temporary works in the hands of a brave and skilful garrison are susceptible of a longer defence than was generally supposed. They were attacked as field works never were before, and were defended as field works never had been defended. The main difference between properly constructed permanent fortifications (intended to resist a siege) and temporary works is, that the latter seldom present an insuperable obstacle against assault, "while the former always do. In addition, permanent works have a better command over the adjacent country, and are more carefully and perfectly planned. The masonry walls, which render an assault impossible, cannot he seen from the distance, and can he destroyed only by establishing batteries on the crest of the glacis or the edge of the ditch; the earthen ramparts alone being visible beyond that point, they may, until the besiegers arrive there, be regarded in the same light as field works, with the difference that the garrison are not harassed by the necessity of being constantly prepared to repel an assault. Now, in the siege of Sebastopol, the trenches of the besiegers never reached the edge of the ditch; so that, had the fortification been a permanent one, the most difficult, slow, and dangerous part of the siege remained to be undertaken, viz: the crowning of the covered way, the establishment of the breach batteries, the descent and passage of the ditch, and the assault of the breach; in other words, at the moment when the weakness of the temporary works became apparent and fatal, the true strength of the permanent defences would have commenced coming into play.

Assuming the progress of the attack to have been as rapid as it was under existing circumstances, the besiegers, on the 8th of September, would not yet have been in a condition to crown the covered way, the siege would certainly have extended into the winter; and it may even be doubted whether the place would eventually have fallen, until the allies were in sufficient force to invest the north as well as the south side.

From the fleet and the naval arsenals were undoubtedly derived the means of arming and equipping the land defences; on many occasions the fire of the vessels up the ravines, as well as their vertical fire, was probably attended with effect, yet I can see no reason to coincide in the opinion that the presence of the fleet justified the allies in failing to advance upon the town immediately after their arrival in front of it. No doubt the fire of the vessels would have rendered it impossible for the allies to have occupied immediately the lower parts of the town and the shores of the harbor, but the nature of the ground was such that they could have opposed no serious resistance to the allied occupation of the positions subsequently occupied by the Malakof, Redan, and Flagstaff Bastion. Once holding these points, it would have been easy for the allies to establish batteries commanding at once the fleet and the town; defence would have been impossible, and the opening of their fire must have been the signal alike for the destruction of the fleet and the evacuation of the south side.

We will now pass to the works of attack.

So great was their extent, some 6 miles from the extreme right to the furthest left, with a development that has been stated, probably without exaggeration, to exceed 40 miles, and so broken was the ground over which they stretched, that it is impossible to give in a report like this anything approaching to a definite idea of their plan. An endeavor will be made merely to point out how far the besiegers departed from, or conformed to, their established systems for works of this nature.

As the selection of the points of attack, and the positions to he occupied to cover the siege must first have engaged the attention of the allied commanders, they will naturally be the first objects for our consideration.

In the determination of the position for covering the siege there were two things to be considered: 1st, the power of resisting the efforts of a relieving army; 2d, the facility of bringing up to the front the various supplies required in the operations.

The strength of the position afforded by the plateau of the Chersonese has already been referred to; with the small force at first present on the part of the allies, it is certain that their position -would have teen much stronger and more secure had they confined themselves to the occupation of the plateau, holding the valleys to the east only by detachments to observe the enemy. The English, supposing that their position and point of attack remained as it was, would have had a somewhat greater distance to pass over in the transportation of their supplies; but by abandoning Balaklava for Kazatch they would have obtained a much more extensive and convenient harbor, and the united efforts of the two armies would have enabled them to construct, in ample season, a good road for the passage of their trains. Had the siege been undertaken by a French army alone, it can scarcely be doubted that Kamiesch and Kazatch would have been used to the exclusion of Balaklava; at all events, Balaklava would have been employed only as a temporary depot, when the roads were good and the enemy at a distance; here the insuperable evils of a divided command probably intervened. In this case the barren and disastrous day of Balaklava would never have occurred; the force and labor employed in protecting Balaklava would have placed the position of Inkermann in such a state of defence as either to have deterred the Russians from engaging in the battle or to have secured the victory to the allies without the frightful cost and great uncertainty attending that eventful contest.

In the actual condition of affairs, if either on the 25th October or the 5th November the Russians had succeeded in carrying Balaklava, the English army would have been reduced to the most desperate extremity by the total loss of all its supplies and means of transportation. It is possible that the result would have been the total abandonment of the siege, and a retreat upon Kamiesch, to embark there as rapidly as transportation could be obtained.

To anticipate objections, it may be stated that, during the winter of 1854 and 1855, no supplies were drawn from the country beyond Balaklava, and that the only advantages derived from its occupation were: inextricable confusion in unloading vessels and despatching supplies,
arising from the want of size of the harbor and the steepness of its banks*; wretched roads over
the muddy soil; a steep ascent to be overcome in reaching the plateau; finally, the constant
and lively anticipation of being entirely deprived of these uncertain advantages upon the first
resolute attack by the enemy in force. The most probable reasons for the selection of Balaklava
as the English depot are, that it was somewhat nearer the position on the plateau; that it was
not taken by the French; and that since it existed, it would be a pity that it should remain
idle.

*see picture above.